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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Roderick Rainger Mangum appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to forgery of a financial transaction card.

On appeal,

Mangum challenges the district court's denials of his motion to dismiss and
motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Idaho law enforcement officers suspected Mangum of using stolen credit
card numbers to purchase prepaid gift cards, lottery tickets, and other items.
(PSI, pp.2-3; 8/10/10 Tr., p.139, L.5 - p.140, L.13.)

Mangum also had an

outstanding warrant out of California for fraud-related charges. (PSI Attachments
pp.8, 46-52; 8/10/10 Tr., p.144, L.24 - p.145, L.6.)

On November 10, 2008,

officers approached Mangum outside of his Boise apartment complex and
inquired about his identity. (PSI, p.2; PSI Attachments p.8.) Mangum told them
that he had identification in his apartment. (PSI, p.2; PSI Attachments p.8.) The
officers followed Mangum to his apartment and arrested him on the California
warrant after he presented his driver's license. (PSI, p.2; PSI Attachments p.8.)
Inside Mangum's apartment, officers observed numerous receipts, gift
cards, and bank information lying on the kitchen table.

(PSI, p.2; PSI

Attachments p.8.) Based in part on this evidence they observed in plain view,
the officers obtained a warrant to search the remainder of the apartment. (PSI,
pp.2-3; PSI Attachments p.8; 8/3/10 Tr., p.44, Ls.6-12.)
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In executing that

warrant, the officers recovered approximately 75 stolen credit card numbers and
other evidence.

(PSI, pp.2-3; PSI Attachments pp.4, 11

2.)

Mangum was

transported to California, and the Idaho authorities continued to investigate
Mangum's Idaho crimes. (PSI Attachments, pp.8-45.)
On January 12, 2009, while Mangum was being held in the Orange
County jail awaiting trial on his California charges, Idaho charged him, by criminal
complaint, with two counts of Grand Theft by Unauthorized Control. (R., pp.8-9.)
The district court issued an arrest warrant, which the Ada County Prosecutor's
Office faxed to the Orange County Sheriff's Office on June 7, 2009. (R., pp.3739.)
While still housed in the Orange County jail, Mangum became aware of
the Idaho charges and active arrest warrant. (8/3/10 Tr., p.57, L.15 - p.58, L.18.)
He began sending letters to the Ada County Prosecutor's Office, Ada County
district court, and to Orange County jail staff, demanding transport to Idaho and
final resolution of his Idaho charges, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers (hereinafter "lAD").

(R., pp.11-14, 19, 102-105, 125-132, 136-139;

8/3/10 Tr., p.61, L.15 - p.64, L.12.)
At some point, Mangum reached a plea agreement and pled guilty to three
California felonies.

(R., pp.15-18.) On June 30, 2009, he was sentenced on the

California charges. (R., pp.93-94.) On July 22, 2009, Mangum was transferred
from the Orange County jail to a California state prison to serve his sentence.
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(B13/10 Tr., p.66, Ls.12-17.) On October 19, 2009, he was transferred to another
California correctional facility. (B13/10 Tr., p.B1, LS.1 9-20.)
While

in

prison,

Mangum

continued

to send

letters and

communications to various parties demanding transport to Idaho.

inmate

(B13/10 Tr.,

p.67, L.5 - p.76, L.B; R., pp.20-22, 24-29,97-100,110-124,133-135,140-141.)
Mangum's father also exchanged phone calls with the Ada County Prosecutor's
Office on the issue. (Defendant's Exhibit 0;1 see BI3/10 Tr., p.3, L.21 - p.4, L.3.)
In August 2009, California prison officials informed Mangum that his requests
were premature because Idaho had not yet placed a detainer on him.
(Defendant's Exhibit N; R., p.11B.) On October 19, 2009, the Ada County district
court conducted a status hearing on the matter.

(R., p.23; see generally

10/19/09 Tr.) At that hearing, an Ada County Deputy Prosecutor indicated he
had been in contact with the California Department of Corrections regarding
Mangum's requests to be transported to Idaho, and that he anticipated receiving
the appropriate forms from California to complete the lAD process "within the
next few weeks." (See generally 10/19109 Tr.)
On October 23, 2009, California prison officials generated a "detainer
summary," which acknowledged receipt of an Idaho detainer.
Exhibit K; BI3/10 Tr., p.B1, L.5 - p.B3, L.22.)

(Defendant's

As a result of the detainer, the

1 By its order dated November 7, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court granted
Mangum's motion to augment the appellate record with Exhibits J-O admitted at
the August 3, 2010 hearing.
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California

Department

of Corrections

placed

Mangum

in

administrative

segregation. (Defendant's Exhibit J; 8/3/10 Tr., p.81, L.5 - p.83, L.22.)
On December 16, 2009, the California Department of Corrections
prepared and executed the relevant lAD forms and forwarded them, with
Mangum's notice and trial demand, to the Ada County Prosecutor's Office and
Ada County district court, which received them on December 28, 2009.

(PSI

Attachments, pp.175-179; R., pp.35-36, 142-143, 233.)
Mangum was thereafter transported to Idaho, and was initially arraigned
on his Idaho charges on February 5, 2010.

(R., pp.33-34, 40.) A preliminary

hearing, scheduled for February 19, 2010, was postponed due to Mangum's
appointed counsel's conflict of interest. (R., ppA7-48.) Conflict counsel entered
a notice of appearance on February 23, 2010.

(R., ppA9-50.)

On March 4,

2010, Idaho filed an amended complaint charging Mangum with one count of
forgery of a financial transaction card, three counts of criminal possession of a
financial card, and one count of misappropriation of personal identifying
information, all felonies.

(R., pp.54-56.)

Mangum waived the preliminary

hearing, and was bound over and arraigned on the new charges. (R., p.57; see
generally 3/16/10 Tr.) A jury trial was scheduled for May 12, 2010. (R., p.67;
3/16/10 Tr., p.3, L.24 - pA, L.2.)

At a March 16, 2010 hearing, Mangum indicated that he would be filing
motions to suppress and dismiss.

(3/16/10 Tr., pA, L.10 - p.5, L.23.)

The

district court rescheduled the jury trial for August to accommodate these motions
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and the district court's determination of them. (See generally, 4/27/10 Tr.) On
April 27, 2010, Mangum filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the state violated
the lAD by failing to bring him to trial within 180 days of his informal notice and
demand for a jury trial that he sent directly to the Ada County Prosecutor's Office
and Ada County district court.

(R., pp.73-75, 78-87.)

Mangum also filed a

motion to suppress evidence law enforcement officers recovered in his
apartment. (R., pp.76-77, 148-151.)
Prior to the district court's ruling on his motions, Mangum entered a
conditional guilty plea to one count of forgery of a financial transaction card,
preserving his right to appeal if the district court denied either his motion to
suppress or motion to dismiss.

(R., pp.158-161; see generally 8/17/10 Tr.)

Following two hearings, the district court denied both motions. (R., pp.218-224,
229-234; see generally 8/3/10 Tr; 8/10/10 Tr.) The district court then entered a
unified sentence of 14 years with five years fixed on the forgery of a financial
transaction card charge.

(R., pp.242-245.)

pp.246-249.)
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Mangum timely appealed.

(R.,

ISSUES
Mangum states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Mangum's
motion to dismiss based on the State's failure to comply with
the lAD's 180 day deadline?

2.

Whether the district court erred in concluding Mr. Mangum
impliedly consented to law enforcement officers' warrantless
entry into this apartment?

(Appellant's brief, p.9)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Mangum failed to establish that the district court erred in determining
that the state did not violate the Interstate Agreement On Detainers?

2.

Has Mangum failed to show that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Mangum Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Determining
That The State Did Not Violate The Interstate Agreement On Detainers
A.

Introduction
Mangum contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to

dismiss and by concluding that the state did not violate the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-28.) Specifically, Mangum contends that
he "substantially complied" with the lAD procedural requirements by demanding
a trial on his Idaho charges directly to the Ada County prosecutor, and that the
state thus violated the 180-day lAD statute of limitations when it did not arrange
for Mangum's transport back to Idaho until it received a formal notice and
demand through the California Department of Corrections several months later.
(Id.)
Mangum's argument fails because the 180-day lAD statute of limitations
did not begin to run until the Ada County Prosecutor's Office received Mangum's
lAD notice and demand through the California Department of Corrections on
December 28, 2010. Mangum's jury trial was scheduled to occur within 180 days
of this date, until the statute of limitations was tolled for Mangum to pursue
pretrial motions.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review.
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State v. Thompson, 140

Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Darn, 140 Idaho 404,405,
94 P.3d 709,710 (Ct. App. 2004).

C.

The State Did Not Violate The Interstate Agreement On Detainer's Statute
Of Limitations
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("lAD") is an interstate compact

creating uniform procedures among the joining parties for lodging and processing
of "detainers," or legal orders requiring a state imprisoning an individual to hold
that person after completion of his sentence so that another state may receive
that person into its custody to be tried for a different crime. Arizona v. Bozeman,
533 U.S. 146, 149 (2001); I.C. § 19-5001. The provisions of the lAD only apply
to prisoners who have been convicted, sentenced, and are currently serving time
in a penal or correctional institution of a state.

I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1); State v.

Breen, 126 Idaho 305, 307, 882 P.2d 472, 474 (Ct. App. 1994).

Idaho and

California are parties to the lAD. I.C. § 19-5001; Cal. Penal Code § 1389.
The basic purpose of the lAD is to encourage disposition of charges
outstanding against a prisoner and to provide co-operative procedures among
member states to facilitate such disposition.

I.C. § 19-5000(a).

Other basic

purposes of the lAD include preventing detainers from interfering with a
prisoner's rehabilitation, and protecting the right to a speedy trial.

kl

Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have varied as to whether prisoners
are required to "strictly comply" or merely "substantially comply" with the
provisions of the lAD, and whether exceptions to these standards apply.
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See

Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d 817,821, n.4 (Colo. 1997) (reviewing standards of
required prisoner lAD compliance in different jurisdictions but noting that
"[b]ecause interstate arrangements must be made for the transfer, transport, and
trial of a prisoner in the custody of another jurisdiction, application of a strict
compliance requirement promotes interstate reliance on the terms of the compact
and lends stability to fulfilling its objectives," and that "[a]cccordingly, federal
appellate decisions hold that prisoners must strictly comply with the procedures
set forth in the lAD.") (citations omitted). The Idaho appellate courts have not
specifically discussed the degree of required prisoner compliance with the lAD.
By the language of the lAD, four events must occur for a defendant to
invoke the statute and effectuate transfer to another state for trial.

First, the

receiving state must place a detainer on a prisoner in another state. I.C. § 195001 (c)(1).

Second, the warden or custodial official of the sending state is

required to notify the prisoner of the source and contents of the detainer and his
right to make a request for final disposition on the untried charge.
5001 (c)(3).

I.C. § 19-

Third, the prisoner must deliver to the warden or custodial official

holding custody over him a written notice and request for final disposition. I.C. §
19-5001 (c)(2). Fourth, the warden or custodial official must promptly forward the
prisoner's request, and a certificate containing "the term of commitment under
which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to
be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole
eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to
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the prisoner" to the appropriate prosecutor and district court in the receiving
state. I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1), (2).
Once these procedures are completed, the lAD requires that a defendant
be brought to trial within 180 days of the appropriate prosecutor's and district
court's receipt of the defendant's notice, request, and certificate containing the
required information from the warden or custodial official. I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1),
(2); Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 45-52 (1993). A receiving state's failure to
provide a timely trial under the lAD results in dismissal of the charges with
prejudice. I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(4).
In this case, the district court correctly concluded that the 180-day lAD
statute of limitations did not commence until December 28, 2009, the date the
Ada County Prosecutor's Office received the required notice, demand, and
certificate from the California Department of Corrections. (R., pp.229-234.) The
statute of limitations was then tolled within 180 days of this date, when Mangum
began to pursue his dismissal and suppression motions. U.S. v. Odom, 674 F.2d
228, 331 (4th Cir. 1982) (A defendant's pretrial motions toll the lAD statute of
limitations because "[d]elay that is lawful under the Speedy Trial Act generally will
comply with the mandate of [lAD].")
Mangum

contends

that through

his

letter writing

campaign

and

communications with California prison authorities, he "substantially complied"
with the lAD requirements prior to December 28, 2009, and that the lAD 180-day
statute of limitations commenced when the Ada County Prosecutor's Office
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obtained adequate notice of his demand for trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-28.)
However, Mangum's claim fails because he did not comply, substantially or
otherwise, with the language of the lAD, and because by the language of the
statute, the 180-day statute of limitations simply did not begin to run until
December 28,2009, when the lAD procedures were finally completed.

1.

Idaho Did Not Place A Detainer On Mangum Until September Or
October 2009

As discussed above, provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
are only triggered when a state places a detainer on an inmate serving a
sentence in a prison in another state. State v. Bronkema, 109 Idaho 211, 213,
706 P.2d 100, 102 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340,
343 (1978); I.C. § 19-5001(c)(1». Therefore, for a prisoner to initiate a request
for disposition pursuant to the lAD, the receiving state must first place a detainer
on the prisoner. I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(1); New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 112 (2000).
Mangum asserts that that an arrest warrant, faxed by the Ada County
Prosecutor's Office to the Orange County Sheriff's Office on June 7, 2009,
transformed into a detainer on July 22, 2009, when Mangum began serving his
California sentence in a California prison. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-17.) Mangum
thus contends that the lAD began to apply to him at that time. (Id.) Mangum's
assertion fails, however, because the arrest warrant did not contain the
characteristics of a detainer.
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The term "detainer" is
Detainers. However, in

=-=-=~=-:..:.=,

defined in the Interstate Agreement on
the Idaho Court of Appeals, citing the United

States Supreme Court, defined the term "detainer," as used in I.C. § 19-5001, as:
Entail[ing] some form of written communication initiated by
the receiving state which is filed or lodged with the custodial or
sending state requesting the sending state to notify the receiving
state of the prisoner's imminent release from custody, or to hold the
prisoner after his release for the receiving state.
Bronkema, 109 Idaho at 214, 705 P.2d at 103 (parentheticals and emphasis
omitted) (citing Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S 716 (1985); United States v. Mauro,
436 U.S. 340 (1978)).
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Idaho Department of Correction
Interstate Detainer coordinator Cindy McDonald testified that "[aJ detainer is a
certified information, complaint, or indictment with a request to place a detainer."
(8/3/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-12.)

In this case, the district court correctly recognized the arrest warrant was
not a detainer because it did not contain either a certified charging document or a
"request" for California to notify Idaho of Mangum's imminent release from
custody, or to hold him after his release. (R., pp.229-234.) A warrant such as
the one faxed in this case, unlike a detainer, does not even necessarily
contemplate that the person subject to the warrant is in custody at the time. 2
When the Ada County Prosecutor's Office faxed the warrant to the Orange

2Laws other than the lAD govern procedures for the arrest and extradition of
fugitives who are not covered by the lAD because of lack of current detention, or
because of pretrial detainee status. See I.C. § 19-4501, et seq.
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County Sheriff's office, Mangum was merely a pretrial detainee in a county jail he could have subsequently bonded out, been acquitted of the charges, or been
released after the prosecutor or a court dismissed the charges.

Further, as

McDonald testified, a "hold," which a prison may place on an inmate in response
to receipt of an out-of-state arrest warrant, serves a different purpose than a
formal "detainer," which is required to invoke the provisions of the lAD:
[T]he reason we place the hold instead of possibly a detainer
is because the inmate is going to be paroling within a short period
of time or discharging his Idaho sentence, and the time frame for
the I nterstate Agreement on Detainers is not applicable for placing
a detainer against him. Because once you place a detainer and the
person goes to the other jurisdiction, they go to the receiving state.
Once they're finished with all of their charges, they have to be sent
back to the sending state.
If they're paroling or they're discharging, we don't want them
back. So that's why occasionally, if it's untried charges, we'll place
a hold because there's imminent release from prison.
(8/3/10 Tr., p.28, L.24 - p.29, L.11.)

In addition, even if the arrest warrant could have operated as an lAD
"detainer" had Mangum been convicted and serving his sentence at the time it
was placed, the lAD contains no provisions allowing a receiving state to
preemptively detain a prisoner - its only application is to those who have already
been sentenced and are serving time.
Several jurisdictions have rejected the argument that Mangum makes
here, that a hold or premature detainer can transform into an effective detainer
the moment a defendant begins serving his criminal sentence in a correctional
facility.

See State v. Hargrove, 45 P.3d 376, 383-384 (Kan. 2002) ("Hargrove
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contends in the alternative that the initial filing should be immediately
transformed into a detainer under [the lAD] once sentencing occurs. Hargrove
fails to recognize this would work an unnecessary hardship on a state which files
detainers to have to constantly check on the status of all detained individuals.
We reject this argument.") (citing United States v. Currier, 836 F.2d 11 (1 st Cir.
1987); State v. Herrick, 686 A.2d 602 (Me. 1996)).
The district court concluded that Idaho did not lodge a detainer against
Mangum in California until "about" September 11, 2009.

(R., p.230).

This

conclusion was apparently based on a letter dated October 27, 2009, in which a
California Department of Corrections official informed Mangum that an Idaho
"hold" had been placed on him on September 11, 2009.
However,

the

California

Department of Corrections

did

(R., pp.194-195)

not specifically

acknowledge the existence of an Idaho detainer until October 23, 2009, when it
generated a "detainer summary" form.3

(Defendant's Exhibit K.)

The district

court recognized that, while the faxed arrest warrant did not constitute a detainer,
California began "treating the Defendant as being subject to a detainer" around

The date on which California recognized a detainer as being placed is relevant
to the question of when a detainer was actually placed, since one of the
purposes of the lAD is to prevent detainers from interfering with a prisoner's
housing placement and programming options. I.C. § 19-4501 (a). If a state
department of corrections does not recognize the existence of a detainer, and
does not house and program an inmate as if a detainer had been placed on him,
then the inmate is spared one of the harms that the lAD seeks to prevent.
3

14

this

(Le., the California Department of Corrections placed Mangum in

administrative segregation on October 23, 2009).

(R., p.230; S/3/10 Tr., p.S2,

L.13 - p.S3, L.22; Defendant's Exhibits J, K.)
Because Idaho did not place a detainer on Mangum until, at the earliest,
September or October 2009, the lAD was not applicable to Mangum until that
time.

2.

The California Department Of Corrections Notified Mangum Of The
Idaho Detainer No Later Than December 16, 2009

The second step of the lAD procedure was completed no later than
December 16, 2009, when the California Department of Corrections formally
notified Mangum that Idaho had placed a detainer on him, and advised him of his
rights under the lAD. (R., pp.142-143.)

3.

Mangum Delivered Written Notice And Request For Final
Disposition To California Prison Authorities On December 16,2009

The third step of the lAD procedure was also completed no later than
December 16, 2009, when Mangum signed and delivered his "Inmate's Notice of
Place of Imprisonment and Request for Disposition of Indictments, Informations
or Complaints" to California Prison Authorities. (R., pp.35-36.)

The district court acknowledged it was unclear from the record whether "Idaho
sent new paperwork to California or [if] California, for the first time, treated the
warrant faxed earlier as a detainer." (R., p.230.) It is possible Idaho neverfiled a
detainer on Mangum in California, which would render the lAD inapplicable.
However, this possibility was not raised by the state or considered by the district
court below.
4
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4.

The California Department Of Corrections Forwarded Mangum's
Notice, Request For Final Disposition, And Certificate With
Required Supporting Documentation To The Ada County
Prosecutor's Office And Ada County District Court On December
22,2009

The fourth step of the lAD procedure was completed on December 22,
2009, when the California Department of Corrections forwarded Mangum's
notice, request, and certificate with required supporting documentation to the Ada
County Prosecutor's Office and Ada County district court. (Defendant's Exhibit
K.) These documents were received by the Ada County Prosecutor's Office on
December 28, 2009. (R., pp.230-233; PSI Attachments, p.179.)
On appeal, Mangum contends that this fourth step was not required before
the 180-day lAD statute of limitations commenced in this case because he
directly sent notice, request for final disposition, and most of the required
supporting information directly to the Ada County Prosecutor's Office and Ada
County district court prior to this date. (Appellant's brief, pp.17 -28.)
However, as the district court properly concluded, Mangum's contention
that the letters he sent directly to the Ada County Prosecutor's Office and the
Ada County district court should trigger the 180-day statute of limitations is
simply contrary to the plain language of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
Idaho Code § 19-5001 (c)(2) mandates that the written notice and request for final
disposition "shall" be sent by the prisoner to the warden, who is then required to
promptly forward it, along with the certificate with the required supporting

16

information, to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested.
Policy considerations support the strict compliance with and enforcement
of this procedural requirement. The remedy for a state's violation of the 180-day
statute of limitations, dismissal of the charges with prejudice, is severe.

In light

of that severe remedy, the lAD provides a clear, date certain for commencement
of that statute of limitations -

the prosecutor's receipt of the required

documentation from the prison authority holding custody over the prisoner, sent
by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. I.C. § 19-5001 (c)(2).
The present case illustrates the potential confusion where, instead of
following the lAD procedure, the inmate, while moving between a county jail and
multiple correctional facilities in another state as the criminal proceedings against
him unfold, writes a large number of letters directly to prosecutors, public
defenders, and courts, and utilizes third parties to further contact prosecutors by
telephone.

In circumstances such as these, Mangum's position that receiving

states should be required to parse through these numerous communications and
guess at whether or not a prisoner's request is "close enough" would "create a
trap for unwary prosecuting officials." See Casper v. Ryan, 822 F.2d 1283, 12921293 (3 rd Cir. 1987) (quoting Nash v. Jeffes, 739 F.2d 878,884 (3 rd Cir. 1984)).
To further complicate matters, a state prosecutor who too liberally finds
"substantial compliance" with the lAD in an inmate's communications may find
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himself subject to the shorter 120-day statute

limitations for "state-initiated"

lAD proceedings. I.C. § 19-5001 (d).
The mandatory lAD procedures also provide clear direction to trial and
appellate courts. Without the enforcement of such procedures, courts would be
required to pinpoint a single day at which both "substantial compliance" with the
lAD occurred, and at which the prosecutor of the receiving state obtained
adequate "knowledge" of the defendant's trial demand. Courts would be required
to identify this date from a series of often inartful prisoner letters, inmate
requests, third party telephone calls, and other evidence.

Even Mangum, on

appeal, does not attempt to pinpoint a date at which the Ada County Prosecutor's
Office had "adequate knowledge" of Mangum's notice and trial request, but
instead contends that "as early as August 28 th , but as late as October 19, 2009,
both the court and the prosecutor's office had all of the information necessary
under the lAD to address Mr. Mangum's request to have his Ada County charges
resolved."

(Appellant's brief, p.19.)

The lAD procedures alleviate this

uncertainty.
It is the preference for this "date certain" that convinced the United States
Supreme Court, in Fex v. Michigan, to conclude that it was the court's and the
prosecutor's receipt of the prisoner's notice, as opposed to any actions taken by
the prisoner, which triggered the 180-day speedy trial provision of the lAD. Fex,
507 U.S. at 49 (recognizing that "[i]t seems unlikely that a legislature would
select, for the starting point of a statute of limitations, a concept so indeterminate
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as 'caused,'" and that delivery is a more likely choice for triggering a time limit
because it is more readily identifiable as a point in time).
Several other jurisdictions require prisoners to strictly comply with their
respective provisions of the lAD that require the notice, trial demand, certificate,
and supporting information to be sent through the custodial official rather than
directly from the prisoner to the appropriate prosecutor and district court,
regardless of delay or lack of attention on the part of prison authorities.

See

State v. Smith, 669 P.2d 368, 369-370 (Or. App. 1983); State v. Pero III, 851
A.2d 41(N.J. Super. 2004); Schneider v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 530 (Ky.
App. 2000); Johnson v. Stagner, 781 F.2d 758, 760, n.3 (9 th Cir. 1986); U.S. v.
Pardedes-Batista, 140 F.3d 367, 372-375 (2 nd Cir. 1998); State v. Blackburn, 571
N.W.2d 695 (Wis. App. 1997); Matter of Shapiro v. Jones, 127 Misc.2d 935 (NY.
Sup. Ct. 1985); People v. Jacobs, 596 P.2d 1187 (Colo. 1979); State v. Bass,
320 N.W.2d 824, 825-829 (Iowa 1982).
Mangum also appears to contend that even if the lAD procedure generally
requires what the statute says it does, a prisoner still substantially complies with
the lAD, and the 180-day lAD statute of limitations still commences, when the
inmate does what he reasonably could be expected to do, and where procedural
delays can be attributed to the sending state, in this case California. (Appellant's
brief, p.17 -28.)

This contention fails for two reasons.

First, the California

Department of Corrections complied with the lAD when it promptly forwarded the
required information to Idaho shortly after it recognized that a detainer had been
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placed. Second, even if California's forwarding of the necessary information was
not "prompt" as required by the lAD, such non-compliance does not implicate
Mangum's Idaho charges.
The California Department of Corrections' processing and forwarding of
appropriate lAD documentation was reasonably prompt. Though Mangum wrote
many letters and expressed frustration, prison authorities consistently responded
to his communications, while acknowledging that "[d]ue to reduced staffing
levels" they were "behind in [their] responses." (R., pp.140-141.)
The California Department of Corrections informed Mangum, as late as
August 2009, that he did not yet have any detainers filed on him. (R., p.118.)
As discussed above, California recognized the existence of an Idaho detainer in
either September or October 2009. The record indicates that the lAD forms were
completed several weeks later, on December 16, 2009. (R., pp.35-36, 142-143.)
The forms were forwarded to Idaho shortly thereafter, and received by the Ada
County Prosecutor's Office on December 28, 2009. (R., p.233; PSI Attachments
p.179.) Though the California Department of Corrections was perhaps not able
to process Mangum's requests as instantaneously as Mangum may have liked,
Mangum was not languishing for many months or years as the California
Department of Corrections navigated the lAD procedures.
Even if Mangum could show that that California did not comply with
"promptness" requirements of the lAD, he cannot show that any such noncompliance impacts the lAD statute of limitations or his Idaho charges. As the
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Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized, "the 180-day [lAD] time limit does not
commence until notice is delivered to the appropriate prosecutor and court
despite what a defendant 'mayor may not have done in an attempt to cause
such a delivery or how much or little delay there is in the delivery.'" Peterson v.
State, 139 Idaho 95,99,73 P.3d 108, 112 (Ct. App. 2003) (quoting United States
v. Johnson, 196 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 1999)).
In Peterson, the Idaho Court of Appeals,

in rejecting Peterson's

"substantial compliance" argument, concluded that the lAD 180-day statute of
limitations never commenced where Peterson provided lAD notice and demand
for trial to the appropriate custodial authority in Washington, and where that
custodial authority simply failed to forward the notice, trial demand, and
appropriate supporting documentation to the appropriate Idaho prosecutor.
Peterson, 139 Idaho at 96-98, 73 P.3d at 109-111; see also Fex, 507 U.S. at 52.
If Mangum feels that that the Califomia Department of Corrections violated his
rights under federal or California law, he may pursue other remedies, including a
civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The 180-day lAD statute of limitations commenced on December 28,
2009. Shortly thereafter, Idaho arranged for Mangum's transport to Idaho. (R.,
pp.33-34.) The parties agreed to toll further running of the statute of limitations
on March 4, 2010, so that Mangum could pursue pretrial motions. s (3/4/10 Tr.,

5 In addition, Mangum requested and was granted a continuance on February 5,
2010, to obtain conflict counsel, a request which also tolled the lAD statute of
limitations. (R., pp.47-48.)
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p.13, L.11 - p.18, L.23.)

has thus failed to show that that the district

court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations had not expired, and that
Idaho did not violate the lAD.

II.
Mangum Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His
Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mangum contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to

suppress. (Appellant's brief, pp.28-33.) Specifically, Mangum contends that the
district court erred in concluding that he gave law enforcement officers implied
consent to enter his apartment, where they observed incriminating evidence in
plain view. (ld.) Mangum's argument fails because the record reveals that the
district court correctly concluded that Mangum impliedly consented to the law
enforcement officers' entry into his apartment.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300,302,160 P.3d 739,741 (2007).
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C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Mangum Consented To The
Officers' Entry Into His Apartment
"Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal

and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be
rendered reasonable by an individual's consent." State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693,
695,978 P.2d 881, 883 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516,
522,716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704,707,963 P.2d
387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998)).
Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848,
852,26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). Consent may be either express or implied, and may
be in the form of words, gestures, or conduct. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 221 (1973); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343,348,815 P.2d 1083, 1088
(Ct. App. 1991). Whether consent is valid is a question of fact to be determined
based upon the totality of the circumstances. Varie, 135 Idaho at 852, 26 P.3d at
35 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221). The standard for measuring the scope
of consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness, i.e.,
"what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange
between the officer and the suspect."

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251

(1991); State v. Frizzel, 132 Idaho 522,523, 975 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Ct. App.
1999).

The state bears the burden of proving the validity of consent by a

preponderance of the evidence.

Staatz, 132 Idaho at 695, 978 P.2d at 883;

State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747,749,947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct. App. 1997).
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In this case, the sole issue before the district court on the motion to
suppress was whether Mangum impliedly consented to the law enforcement
officers' entry into his apartment, and thus whether law enforcement was legally
present in Mangum's apartment while making plain view observations that
ultimately helped to establish probable cause for a search warrant. (8/3/10 Tr.,
p.44, Ls.6-12.) Applying the correct legal standards, the district court properly
concluded that Mangum impliedly consented to the officers' entry into his
apartment. (R., pp.218-224.)
First, the district court made factual findings concerning the circumstances
surrounding U.S. Chief Deputy Marshall Platts' contact with Mangum.
pp.218-224.)

Deputy Platts approached

(R.,

Mangum outside of Mangum's

apartment and identified himself as a U.S. Marshall. (8/10/10 Tr., p.148, LS.1416.) At this point, Mangum was aware that there was an active California warrant
for his arrest. (8/3/10 Tr., p.50, Ls.5-21.) Thus, when Deputy Platts approached
Mangum, Mangum appeared to be "extremely excited," but when Deputy Platts
asked Mangum if his name was "Derrick," Mangum was visually relieved.
(8/10/10 Tr., p.158, L.22 - p.159, L.12.) Indeed, as Deputy Platts testified, his
purpose in deceiving Mangum was to both impress a sense of relief upon him, as
well as to encourage him to admit his true identity, and to create a situation
where Mangum was less likely to resist arrest. (8/10/10 Tr., p.159, L.19 - p.160,
L.1.) Deputy Platts indicated to Mangum that if he could confirm that he was not
in fact, "Derrick," he would be free to go. (8/10/10 Tr., p.149, L.18 - p.150, L.7.)
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Following this exchange, Mangum told Deputy Platts, "let's go back to
apartment to get my license. It's in my wallet in my apartment." (R., pp.218-224;
8/10/10 Tr., p.160, Ls.10-13.)

Deputy Platts interpreted this statement and

Mangum's demeanor as an invitation to himself and the other law enforcement
officers to enter into Mangum's apartment with him to retrieve his identification.
(8/10/10 Tr., p.151, L.14 - p.152, L.13.) Mangum never told the officers that they
were not allowed to enter his apartment. (8/10/10 Tr., p.160, Ls.2-9.) Mangum
and the officers then walked to and entered the apartment, where Mangum
produced his license and was arrested. (8/10/10 Tr., p.149, L.19 - p.152, L.17.)
The district court properly concluded that the circumstances, combined
with

Mangum's statements and

demeanor, "would

reasonably lead law

enforcement to believe they could escort [Mangum] to retrieve his license when
he actually did lead them back to his apartment." (R., p.222.) Mangum had a
clear motivation to reveal his true identity to the law enforcement officers, so it
was reasonable for those officers to interpret Mangum's statement as implied
consent to enter, with him, into his apartment kitchen to retrieve his identification.
Mangum has failed to show that the district court erred in concluding that
Mangum gave implied consent for the law enforcement officers to enter his
apartment. This Court must thus affirm the district court's denial of Mangum's
motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
denials of Mangum's motion to dismiss and motion to suppress, and Mangum's
conviction for forgery of a financial transaction card.
DATED this 13th day of March 2012.
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